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MOTHER, MAY I? NO, YOU MAY NOT!
PARENTAL CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR
STUDENTS TO PARTICIPATE IN STUDENT-LED
CLUBS AT PUBLIC SCHOOLS
By: KELLY SHERRILL LINKOUS, ESQ., J.D., PH.D.*
INTRODUCTION
The tension between the parent’s rights to direct the upbringing of
his or her child and the students’ constitutional rights while within the
schoolhouse gate comes to a head when the parent does not support, or
allow, his or her children to join an extra-curricular club at school. That
tension escalates when the child’s religious and speech preferences
conflict with the parent’s, and when the child’s choice to participate in a
faith-based club conflicts with those of the parent’s wishes. So, who
wins? Does a parent always get to determine whether or not her minor
child may or may not join a club? What if a child holds a different
religious belief system than his parent and wants to explore that belief
system through participation in a faith-based, student-led club at school?
Must he ask, “[m]other, may I?” And what if she says, “[n]o, you may
not?” In Georgia, as well as in other states and local school districts
around the nation, a parent’s word is the final decision on whether or not
a child may join a student-led club.1
This article considers the constitutionality of laws or policies
requiring parental consent for student participation in school-based clubs
or organizations, as well as their consistency with the federal Equal

* Assistant Professor, The George Washington University Graduate School of Education
and Human Development; Ph.D., 2009, University of Georgia; J.D., with Honors, 2001,
The George Washington University; M.Ed., summa cum laude, 1997, University of
Georgia; B.S.Ed., magna cum laude, 1995, University of Georgia.
1
See, e.g., GA. CODE § 20-2-705 (2006) (parental permission for participation); OKLA.
STAT. TIT. 70 § 24-105 (2009) (student club and organization—regulation—notifications);
UTAH CODE §§ 53A-11-1209, 1210 (2007) (parental consent).
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Access Act (“EAA”).2 This article utilizes the Georgia “parental consent
for participation in clubs”3 law as a vehicle to analyze the
constitutionality of comparable participation policies.4 This article
2
Compare id. (states requiring parental consent) with, The Equal Access Act, 20
U.S.C. § 4071–74 (2011).
3
Ga. Code § 20-2-705 (2006).
4
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. TIT. 70 § 24-105 (2009) (student club and organization—
regulation—notifications, provides:
The policy adopted by each board of education shall provide parents or
guardians of students with an opportunity to notify school administration
that the parent or guardian is withholding permission for a student to join or
participate in one or more clubs or organizations. . . .
The policy shall only apply to participation in clubs and organizations that
are extracurricular and shall not apply to participation in clubs and
organizations that are necessary for a required class of instruction. Parents
or guardians shall be responsible for preventing their student from
participating in a club or organization in which permission is withheld. . . .
Parents or guardians shall also be responsible for retrieving their student
from attendance at a club or organization in which permission is withheld.
Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a club or organization from meeting
when a student who is not authorized to be in the club or organization is
present at such meeting.);
Utah Code §§ 53A-11-1209 (2007) (provides:
(1) A school shall require written parental or guardian consent for student
participation in all curricular and noncurricular clubs at the school.
(2) Membership in curricular clubs is governed by the following rules:
(a) (i) membership may be limited to students who are currently attending
the sponsoring school or school district; and
(ii) members who attend a school other than the sponsoring school shall
have, in addition to the consent required under Section 53A-11-1210,
specific parental or guardian permission for membership in a curricular club
at another school;
(b) (i) curricular clubs may require that prospective members try out based
on objective criteria outlined in the application materials; and
(ii) try-outs may not require activities that violate the provisions of this part
and other applicable laws, rules, and policies.);
id. at § 53A-11-1210 (provides:
(1) A school shall require written parental or guardian consent for student
participation in all curricular and noncurricular clubs at the school.
(2) The consent described in Subsection (1) shall include an activity
disclosure statement containing the following information:
(a) the specific name of the club;
(b) a statement of the club’s purpose, goals, and activities;
(c) a statement of the club’s categorization, which shall be obtained from the
application for authorization of a club in accordance with the provisions of
Section 53A-11-1204 or 53A-11-1205, indicating all of the following that
may apply:
(i) athletic;
(ii) business/economic;
(iii) agriculture;
(iv) art/music/performance;
(v) science;
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tackles the central question of whether requiring parental notification and
permission prior to students joining school clubs or organizations, such
as the Gay Straight Alliance (“GSA”)5, the Bible Club, or other
viewpoint or content-related activities, violates the First Amendment’s
freedom of speech provision6 or the EAA.
At the outset, the article examines Georgia’s statute mandating
parental consent for participation in clubs, its impetus, and its legislative
history. This section uses Georgia’s parental consent for participation
statute as a proxy to examine similar state and local policies. Next, the
article reviews the EAA, the First Amendment, and case law involving
parent’s fundamental rights to direct and control the education of their
children. This section discusses two relevant decisions—the Eleventh
and Third Circuits split on the constitutionality of whether a parental
notification or consent requirement for students to opt-out of the Pledge
of Allegiance and other “patriotic” activities is required. Finally, this
article analyzes the legality of the Georgia “parental consent for clubs”
statute under the EAA and the First Amendment, concluding that it, and
similar parental consent for participation policies, violates the EAA and
could unconstitutionally infringe on students’ First Amendment rights.

(vi) gaming;
(vii) religious;
(viii) community service/social justice; and
(ix) other;
(d) beginning and ending dates;
(e) a tentative schedule of the club activities with dates, times, and places
specified;
(f) personal costs associated with the club, if any;
(g) the name of the sponsor, supervisor, or monitor who is responsible for
the club; and
(h) any additional information considered important for the students and
parents to know.
(3) All completed parental consent forms shall be filed by the parent or the
club’s sponsor, supervisor, or monitor with the school’s principal, the chief
administrative officer of a charter school, or their designee.);
see also, Kate Royal, Proposed LGBT club prompts new Rankin school policy, THE
CLARION-LEDGER, Jan. 15, 2015, available at http://www.clarionledger.com/
story/news/local/2015/01/14/rankin-schools-gay-club-policy/21745481/ (a report by the
Clarion Ledger newspaper about a 2015 policy modification by the Rankin County
School Board in Mississippi that adopted a parental consent policy for students to
participate in clubs with the alleged intention to prevent students from joining gaystraight alliance type clubs).
5
See What is a GSA?, GSANETWORK, https://www.gsanetwork.org/resources/
building-your-gsa/what-gsa (last visited Sept. 7 2015).
6
U.S. Const. amend. I.
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GEORGIA’S STATUTE REQUIRING PARENTAL CONSENT FOR
STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN CLUBS
In the mid-2000s, the Georgia legislature enacted a law codifying a
long-standing school district practice requiring students to obtain
parental consent prior to participation in clubs, organizations, sports, and
other extracurricular activities.7 While not dispositive of a statute’s
constitutionality,8 understanding its impetus and legislative history,
including the motivations of the legislator(s) who introduced the
legislation, sometimes foreshadows whether a court will uphold the
statute or find it unconstitutional.9

The Statute, as Codified, Requires Parental Consent for a
Student’s Participation in Clubs and Organizations Sponsored by
the School
In 2006, after many drafts, committee reports, and amendments, the
Georgia General Assembly adopted Senate Bill 413, “Parental consent
for participation in school clubs and organizations.”10 The bill was
codified as the Official Code of Georgia Section 20-2-705.11 The Bill
provides:

(a) As used in this Code section, the term:
(1) “Clubs and organizations” means clubs and
organizations comprised of students who wish to
organize and meet for common goals, objectives, or
purposes and which is directly under the sponsorship,
direction, and control of the school. This term shall
include any activities reasonably related to such clubs
and organizations, but shall not include competitive
interscholastic activities or events.
(2) “Competitive interscholastic activity” means
functions held under the auspices or sponsorship of a
7

Ga. Code § 20-2-705 (2006).
See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980) (“We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the
starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a
clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive.”).
9
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (utilizing the
text alongside the history and background of a school board prayer policy to determine its
constitutionality).
10
Ga. SB 413 (2006).
11
Ga. Code § 20-2-705 (2006).
8
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school that involves its students in competition between
individuals or groups representing two or more schools.
This term shall include cheerleading, band, and chorus.
(b) Each local board of education shall include in the
student code of conduct distributed annually at the
beginning of each school year pursuant to Code Section
20-2-736 information regarding school clubs and
organizations. Such information shall include without
limitation the name of the club or organization, mission
or purpose of the club or organization, name of the club’s
or organization’s faculty advisor, and a description of
past or planned activities. On the form included in the
student code of conduct, as required in Code Section 202-751.5, the local board of education shall provide an
area for a parent or legal guardian to decline permission
for his or her student to participate in a club or
organization designated by him or her.
(c) For clubs or organizations started during the school year,
the local board of education shall require written permission
from a parent or guardian prior to a student’s participation.12
The language ultimately adopted by both houses and signed by the
governor, however, was not a part of SB 413 as introduced.13 It was not
until Georgia Senator Nancy Schaefer proposed a second amendment to
the bill, including language similar to the final draft that the parental
consent provision became part of SB 413.14 As discussed below, Senator
Schaefer was particularly interested, on behalf of her White County
constituents, in the adoption of a parental consent for clubs statute.15

12

Ga. SB 413 (2006).
The Compulsory School Attendance Law, S.B. 413, 2006 Sess. (Ga. 2006),
available
at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/display/20052006/SB/413
(introduced, Jan. 12, 2006, without the parental consent requirement, by Senators Moody
of the 56th, Weber of the 40th, Douglas of the 17th, Thomas of the 2nd, Fort of the 39th,
and others; signed by governor on May 5, 2006)
14
Compare id. with SB 413, 2006 Sess. (Ga. 2006), Floor Amend. I AM 33 0426
available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20052006/58338.pdf (amendment
offered by Senators Schaefer of the 50th, Rogers of the 21st, Williams of the 19th, and
Seabaugh of the 28th)
15
See infra note 45.
13
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White County P.R.I.D.E. v. Board of Education of White County:
Conflict over a Gay/Straight Alliance Student Group
White County is a small county in the northeast Georgia mountains,
primarily comprised of Cleveland, the birthplace of the Cabbage Patch
Kids, and Helen, a “Bavarian” tourist town chock full of Christmas
stores, candy stores, and arts and crafts galore.16 The White County
school board is located in Cleveland, as is the only high school in the
White County Public School System (White County High School).17 All
totaled, White County schools have approximately 3,700 students
between the High School (grades 9–12), the Ninth Grade Academy
(grade 9), the Middle School (grades 6–8), the Intermediate School
(grades 3–5), two elementary schools (grades K-5), and a primary school
(grades K-2).18
In January 2005, a student plaintiff met with the new principal of
White County High School ( “WCHS”) to request recognition of a
GSA.19 She submitted her request in writing, stating that she wished to
form a GSA to “create a ‘safe ground’ for lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgender students who experienced bullying at school.”20 The
principal denied the request at first, but later informed plaintiff students
that they could form the GSA if they provided the principal with a list of
proposed members and by-laws.21 The principal did not require any other
noncurricular student group to comply with these requirements prior to
school recognition.22
In the meantime, the White County community began to protest the
GSA formation.23 Several students wore t-shirts with opposition
messages printed on them. Other students pushed the envelope by
requesting formation of a “Redneck Club,” a “Wiccan Club,” and a

16

See WHITE COUNTY GEORGIA, http://whitecounty.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2015);
COUNTY
CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE,
Visiting
White
County,
WHITE
http://www.aboutnorthgeorgia.com/ang/White_County (last visited Sept. 7, 2015).
17
See WHITE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, White County Schools, Board of Education,
available at http://www.white.k12.ga.us/?DivisionID=9933&ToggleSideNav= (last
modified Mar. 21, 2013).
18
WHITE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, White County Schools, available at
http://www.white.k12.ga.us/ (last modified Mar. 21, 2013).
19
White Cnty. High Sch. Peers Rising in Diverse Educ. v. White Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
2006 WL 1991990 at *1 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2006).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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“Southern Heritage Club.”24 Notably, under the EAA, any of these clubs
should be approved in the absence of disruption to the school.25
To appease the school, the GSA adopted the name “Peers Rising in
Diverse Education” (“PRIDE”) and altered the group’s mission statement
to accommodate bullying or harassment of any student for any reason.26
In late March 2005, the school formally recognized PRIDE and the group
met on campus three times during the remainder of the 2004-2005 school
year.27
In March 2005, the White County board of education created the
clubs and organizations committee, which recommended elimination of
all noncurricular-related clubs and organizations.28 The board of
education adopted those the recommendation.29 Accordingly, the WCHS
principal reviewed the existing clubs and organizations, disbanding those
he considered “noncurricular-related.”30 The disbanded clubs included
the Fellowship of Christian Athletes (“FCA”), the Key Club, the Interact
Club, and PRIDE.31
However, the school did not disband the Student Council, the
Youth Advisory Council (“YAC”), the Shotgun Club, the Beta Club, a
prayer group, the Dance Team, and the Prom Group.32 As discussed
below, the existence of these noncurricular-related clubs on school
campus invoke the EAA, thereby requiring the school to give access to
all noncurricular-related clubs.33 Because the school did not give equal
access to PRIDE as it did the other noncurricular-related clubs, it denied
the club equal access and a fair opportunity to conduct meetings on
school premises under the EAA.34
Accordingly, on July 14, 2006, the court enjoined White County
School Board and WCHS from: (1) denying students of PRIDE equal
access or fair opportunity to conduct a meeting on school premises
during non-instructional time; and (2) discriminating against student
groups on the basis of religious, political, philosophical, or other content
of their speech.35

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id.
White Cnty., 2006 WL 1991990 at *3.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
White Cnty., 2006 WL 1991990 at * 2.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3–4, 13–14.
Id. at * 13–14.
Id.
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White County Legislators Push for a Parental Consent Provision
During the course of the White County PRIDE litigation, White
County Senator Nancy Schaefer and others were working to find another
route to preclude students from joining PRIDE or any other GSA.36 In
fact, prior to Senator Schaefer’s introduction of Senate Bill 14937
(“School/Extracurricular Activities; written notification; withhold
permission”), in February 2005 she stated, “she believes many parents
need to be involved in deciding what school activities their children
attend, especially those involving sexuality.”38
Senate Bill 149 (and accompanying House Bill 661) did not go
forward during the 2005 General Assembly.39 However, in exchange for
pursuing the law, legislators put the pressure on the Department of
Education to pass a rule containing the “parental consent for clubs”
mandate.40 Plaintiffs in the already-filed White County PRIDE case were
concerned with the implementation of such a rule.41 Regarding the
impetus for the rule and response to PRIDE, one plaintiff’s father stated,
“[a] lot of children are afraid . . . . That’s one of the problems.
Orientation is not something you choose. Being gay is an orientation.
And a lot of parents don’t understand.”42 Another plaintiff commented on
the parental consent requirement, “I know kids, they’ve told things to
their parents, and they’ve pretty much kicked them out of the house . . . .
Some people won’t say anything to their parents.”43

36
Brandon Larrabee, Schools’ gay-straight clubs feel targeted by new Board of
Education proposal; Rule would require students to get their parents’ permission before
joining select organizations, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, May 31, 2005, at A-1 (Senator
Schaefer tried to dispute the rule’s targeting gay-straight alliances, stating that “some
parents might not want their children involved in more than two or three clubs at the
same time, though she concede[d] that the White County controversy added some
immediacy to the issue.”); Dyana Bagby, Schools weigh parental permission policies;
Districts urged to act before state mandates rules for student clubs, SOUTHERN VOICE
ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2006), (this source in no longer available online, but a hard copy of the
online newspaper is on file with the author). (Additionally, as reported in Southern Voice
Online in January 2006, Senator Schaefer said publicly “she opposes gay-straight
alliances.”).
37
Ga. SB 149 (2005), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/enUS/Display/20052006/SB/149.
38
Brian Basinger, Bill calls for parent consent in school activities; Opponents say
measure puts undue burden on school staff, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Feb. 10, 2005, at B-5.
39
Ga. SB 142 (2005); Ga. HB 661 (2005), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/
legislation/en-US/Display/20052006/HB/661.
40
Mary MacDonald, Rule aimed at gay clubs would make all students get approval,
THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., Mar. 18, 2005, at 1D.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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At a hearing before the Georgia Department of Education, Senator
Schaefer testified, “[c]hildren today are swimming in a sea of drugs and
pornography and violence and abortion, and we can go on and on and on.
Children in high school cannot be expected to make lifetime decisions.”44
Despite the State Superintendent’s support and months of delays,
committee re-writes, and debate,45 the Georgia Board of Education
rejected the rule in a 10-3 vote.46
Nancy Schaefer and other supporters did not wait long to
reintroduce the parental consent bill in the State Senate.47 When Senate
Bill 413 came before the Senate in January 2006, it did not contain any
reference to the parental consent provision.48 However, in a Floor
Amendment, Senator Schaefer inserted the language almost exactly as
codified in existing law.49 Despite attempts by the Georgia School
Board’s Association to “stave off” the Parental Consent Bill,50 and
throughout reviews by both the Senate and the House education

44

Brandon Larrabee, Club proposal called discriminatory, The Augusta Chronicle,
Apr. 14, 2005, at B06 available at http://old.chronicle.augusta.com/stories/2005/
04/14/met_450257.shtml.
45
Brandon Larrabee, Hot debate delays vote on school club consent; Critics: Plan
hurts gay-straight groups, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Apr. 15, 2005, at B-1; Brandon
Larrabee, It’s club rule vs. children’s freedom at Board of Education hearing; Rule would
require parental permission to take part in extracurricular organizations, FLORIDA TIMESUNION, June 9, 2005, at A-1; Mary MacDonald, School clubs’ parental OK due for vote,
THE ALTANTA JOURNAL-CONST., June 9, 2005, at 1C; Mary MacDonald, Looking ahead:
Decision Tuesday; State school board to vote on parental permission for students joining
organizations, THE ALTANTA JOURNAL-CONST., June 12, 2005, at Northside, 11ZH.
46
Brandon Larrabee, Club permission rule rejected, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, June
15, 2005, at B01; Paul Donsky, Board rejects rule to require parental OK for school
clubs, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., June 15, 2005, at 1D; Staff and Wire Report,
Permission not needed to join clubs in schools, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, June
19, 2005, at NG1; Staff, Parental permission not required, EDUC. WEEK, June 22, 2005,
at p. 25, Vol. 24, No. 41.
47
See SB 413, 2006 Leg. Sess, Floor Amendment 1 (Ga. Feb. 2006).
48
Ga. L. 2006, p. 851, § 4/SB 413 (introduced, Jan. 12, 2006, without the parental
consent requirement, by Senators Moody of the 56th, Weber of the 40th, Douglas of the
17th, Thomas of the 2nd, Fort of the 39th, and others; signed by governor on May 5,
2006).
49
SB 413, 2006 Leg. Sess, Floor Amendment 1 (Ga. Feb. 2006) (amendment offered
by Senators Schaefer of the 50th, Rogers of the 21st, Williams of the 19th, and Seabaugh
of the 28th); see also Vicky Eckenrode, Democrat calls vote for school bill abrupt, THE
AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Jan. 25, 2006, at B02, available at http://chronicle.augusta.com/
stories/2006/01/25/met_49153.shtml#.Ve4C8vZViko.
50
Dyana Bagby, Schools weigh parental permission policies; Districts urged to act
before state mandates rules for student clubs, SOUTHERN VOICE ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2006),
(source is no longer available online, but a hard copy is on file with the author).
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committees, the Senate passed the bill.51 Governor Sonny Perdue signed
the legislation in May 2006.52 The Bill became effective July 1, 2006.53
To date, no parties have filed a lawsuit on the basis of the statute;54
however, it is just a matter of time. The statute, for many reasons, is an
unconstitutional violation of students’ First Amendment rights and of the
EAA.55
PARENTAL CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN
STUDENT CLUBS VIOLATE THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT
The Equal Access Act
In 1984, Congress enacted the EAA on the basis of anecdotal
evidence that, despite the protections students enjoyed under the First
Amendment as set forth above, “secondary school students suffered
discrimination at the hands of school administrators, sanctioned by
federal district courts, who believed that the First Amendment precluded
equal access for religious student groups to the public school.”56 The
51

Ga. SB 413 (2005).
GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY LEGISLATION, 2005-2006 Regular Session - SB 413
Compulsory School Attendance Law; exemptions; provide local board of education
policies; minimum annual attendance; change provisions, Status History, available at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/20052006/SB/413.
53
Id.
54
See generally, GA State Court dockets.
55
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56
Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1078-1079 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 130 CONG.
REC. S8331 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch)), cert. denied 540 U.S.
813 (2003) (As further explained in the Senate Report, The standard of ‘equal access’
was used by the Supreme Court in Widmar v. Vincent, to describe the free speech
principle safeguarded by Section 2(a). In Section 2(a), as in the Supreme Court decision,
the guarantee of equal access means that religiously oriented student activities of an
extracurricular nature would be allowed under the same terms and conditions as other
extracurricular activities. Under Section 2(a), it would be unlawful to single out a
voluntary student religious activity for discriminatory treatment based on the fact that the
form or content of its expression is religious. The opportunity for an extracurricular
religious group to meet and have access to public school facilities could not be restricted
solely because the activity included religious speech or prayer. This provision follows the
Supreme Court decision in Widmar v. Vincent, which held that religious speech is
entitled to the same First Amendment protections as non-religious speech.); S. Rep. No.
98-357, at 38-39 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2384-85 (cited by Prince
v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1080-1081 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 540 U.S. 813 (2003))
(As noted in Prince v. Jacoby, supra, at 1081, n.1, “Senate Report 98-357 was written by
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to accompany the committee’s favorable
recommendation to the Senate of Senate Bill 1059, a proposed Equal Access Act. See S.
Rep. No. 98-357, at 1. Although Senate Bill 1059 was not the bill that ultimately became
the Equal Access Act, much of the Act was derived from Senate Bill 1059, and the
Senate report accompanying that bill is relevant to our analysis.”).
52
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legislative history of the EAA “makes it clear that the purpose of the Act
was to confirm students’ rights to freedom of speech, freedom of
association, and free exercise of religion.”57 The legislative history also
reveals that the main purpose of the EAA was to “address student
involvement in religious activities during extracurricular periods of the
school day.”58
As enacted, however, the Act differs from the original bill because
it concerns religious, political, philosophical, and other activities.59 Since
its inception, the EAA has been applied in cases involving Bible clubs,60
other Christian clubs,61 and—in the most recent and controversial
cases—GSA62 or other similar clubs.63
57
White Cnty., 2006 WL 1991990 at *12 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-710; S. Rep. No.
98-357).
58
Id.
59
Id. at *12 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (schools cannot discriminate against student
groups based on “the religious, political, philosophical, or other content” of the group’s
speech)).
60
See, e.g., Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (the EAA’s effects
of allowing Bible club on school campus does not violate the Establishment Clause);
Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 540 U.S. 813 (2003)
(preclusion of Bible Club violated EAA); Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336
F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003) (preclusion of Bible Club violated EAA).
61
See, e.g., ALIVE v. Farmington Pub. Schs, 2007 WL 2572023 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 5,
2007) (holding that preclusion of the Christian group ALIVE violated EAA); Westfield
High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 2003).
62
See, e.g., Gay-Straight Alliance of Yulee High School v. Sch. Bd. of Nassau
County, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (preliminarily enjoining school district
from declining recognition of GSA); Gay-Straight Alliance of Okeechobee High Sch. v.
School Bd. of Okeechobee County, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that
the GSA’s purpose was to promote tolerance and equality among students, regardless of
sexual orientation); 483 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (court granted GSA’s request
for preliminary injunction and ordered school board to officially recognize the GSA with
the privileges granted to other school clubs); 242 F.R.D. 644 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2007)
(granting protective order for discovery); 571 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (permanently enjoining
school board “from denying equal access and recognition to the GSA at OHS as a
noncurricular student group which shall be afforded all rights and privileges granted to
other noncurricular student groups”); Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 2003 WL
22670934 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2003); 311 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding
that the entire subject matter of sexual activity was banned at the school, that the
information on the group’s web site was lewd and offensive, the group’s existence and
message created a material and substantial interference with the district’s educational
mission, and therefore preclusion was not based on the group’s viewpoint); Boyd County
High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance (GSA) v. Board of Educ. of Boyd County, 258 F. Supp.
2d 667 (E.D. Ky 2003) (court enjoined school board to give GSA equal status as other
student groups); Colin by and through Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d
1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that existence of other noncurriculum-related clubs
established limited open forum and preclusion of GSA violated EAA); East High
Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1356
(D. Utah 1998) (holding that the school did not have any “noncurriculum related” clubs
and the EAA did not apply); 81 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Utah 1999) (finding that the
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The Equal Access Act (“EAA”) provides as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which
receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited
open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or
discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious,
political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such
meetings.

....
(c) Fair opportunity criteria. Schools shall be deemed to
offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct a
meeting within its limited open forum if such school
uniformly provides that –
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the
school,
the government, or its agents or employees;
. . . and
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct,
control,

school’s accommodation of only curriculum related clubs does not result in viewpoint
discrimination against GSA); 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that “if”
another noncurriculum related club existed at the school, then precluding the GSA would
violate the EAA); 1999 WL 1390255 (D. Utah Nov. 30, 1999) (court dismissed plaintiffs’
second amended complaint for injunctive relief because defendant’s resounding
affirmation that “gay-positive” viewpoints could be freely expressed in curriculumrelated student groups, coupled with the fact that no student was reprimanded for
expression of “gay positive” views, dispelled any inference that an unwritten policy
forbade “gay-positive” views).
63
See, e.g., Straights and Gays for Equality (SAGE) v. Osseo Area Schs, Dist. No.
279, 2006 WL 983904 (D. Minn. Apr. 4, 2006) (granting SAGE’s motion for preliminary
injunction and holding that preclusion of SAGE, when school has at least nine other
noncurricular groups, violates EAA); 2006 WL 890754 (D. Minn. Apr. 6, 2006) (denying
school district’s motion to temporarily stay the order of April 4, 2006); 471 F.3d 908 (8th
Cir. 2006) (upholding district court’s order granting SAGE’s motion for preliminary
injunction); 2007 WL 2885810 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2007) (court grants SAGE’s motion
for partial summary judgment, holding that preclusion of SAGE, when school has at least
nine other noncurricular groups, violates EAA), aff’d by 540 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2008).
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or regularly attend activities of student groups.
(d) Construction of title [20 USCS §§ 4071 et seq.] with
respect to certain rights. Nothing in this title [20 USCS
§§ 4071 et seq.] shall be construed to authorize the
United States or any State or political subdivision
thereof....
(7) to abridge the constitutional rights of any person.64
The three factors triggering application of the EAA are, (1) a public
secondary school that (2) receives federal funding, and (3) has
established a “limited open forum” by allowing other “noncurricular
related” student groups to meet on school premises.65
The EAA guarantees secondary school students the right to
voluntarily participate in noncurricular66 groups dedicated to religious,
64

20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2007) (emphasis supplied) (The Act defines “limited open
forum” as follows: “A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such
school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student
groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time” id.; additionally, the
Equal Access Act prohibits school employees from:
(1)
to influence the form or content of any prayer or other
religious activity;
(2)
to require any person to participate in prayer or other religious
activity;
(3)
to expend public funds beyond the incidental cost of providing
the space for student-initiated meetings;
(4)
to compel any school agent or employee to attend a school
meeting if the content of the speech at the meeting is contrary to the beliefs
of the agent or employee;
(5)
to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful;
(6)
to limit the rights of groups of students which are not of a
specified numerical size . . . ).
65
Prince, 303 F.3d at 1079 (cert. denied 540 U.S. 813 (2003)).
66
See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2007) (Whether a club is “curriculum-related” or
“noncurriculum” related is debatable. In Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
240, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990), Justice O’Connor defined “curriculum related” as: (1) if the
subject matter of the group is actually taught or will soon be taught, in a regularly offered
course; “a French club would directly relate to the curriculum if a school taught French in
a regularly offered course or planned to teach the subject in the near future”; (2) if the
subject matter of the group concerns the body of courses as a whole – “A school’s student
government would generally relate directly to the curriculum to the extent that it
addresses concerns, solicits opinions, and formulates proposals pertaining to the body of
courses offered by the school”; (3) if participation in the group is required for a particular
course – “If participation in a school’s band or orchestra were required for the band or
orchestra classes”; or (4) if participation in the group results in academic credit – “If
participation in a school’s band or orchestra . . . resulted in academic credit, then those
groups would also directly relate to the curriculum.”
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political, philosophical, or other expressive activities protected by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.67 The EAA defines
the term “secondary school” with reference to state law to determine
what grade levels are covered by the Act.68 Undoubtedly, the EAA
applies to students in high school; the question generally arises regarding
state law’s treatment of middle school or “junior high” school and
whether these are considered “secondary schools.”69 Once a school is
deemed to be a “secondary school,” the EAA applies when the school
gives at least one noncurriculum-related student group (e.g., the Beta
Club or Fellowship of Christian Athletes) access to its facilities,
equipment, or the like during non-instructional time.70
Notably, for this article there are two provisions in the EAA. First,
the Act states that schools are deemed to offer a “fair opportunity” to
students who wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if
such school uniformly provides that the meeting is voluntary and
student-initiated and that “nonschool persons [do] not direct, conduct,
control, or regularly attend activities of student groups.”71 To be
voluntary and student-initiated, the individual student must make the
decision to initiate or join the club.72 The EAA does not provide that
students must obtain parental permission to initiate or join clubs; to do so
The Mergens court specifically rejected the argument that “‘curriculum related’
means anything remotely related to abstract educational goals,” such as “promoting
effective citizenship.” Mergens at 240. The required relationship depends much more on
the specific course’s subject matter compared with the activities of a specific group. “The
difficult question,” stated Justice O’Connor, “is the degree of ‘unrelatedness to the
curriculum’ required for a group to be considered ‘noncurriculum related.’” Id.
Some courts interpret “curriculum related” strictly. See, e.g., Pope v. East
Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that “curriculum-related”
clubs are the obvious groups, such as the math team. Other courts, however, go to great
strides to classify the school’s clubs as “curriculum-related.” For instance, in East High
Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166
(D. Utah 1999), the court held that the Odyssey of the Mind, Future Business Leaders of
America, Future Homemakers of America, and the National Honor Society were
“curriculum-related.” The attempt to classify all student groups as “curriculum-related”
is important because, if the school does not have any noncurricular related clubs, then the
EAA is not invoked. (The First Amendment’s general prescription against discrimination
on the bases of content or viewpoint still would apply.))
67
Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68
See 20 U.S.C. § 4072 (2007) (“As used in this subchapter – The term ‘secondary
school’ means a public school which provides secondary education as determined by
State law.”).
69
20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2007).
70
See id. (the plain meaning of the term “noninstructional time” under the EAA
includes meetings during lunchtime); see Ceniceros by and through Risser v. Board of
Trustees, 106 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997).
71
20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(c).
72
See id.
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would be contrary to the voluntariness and student-initiation provisions
set forth in the Act.73 Furthermore, the EAA’s mandate against the
involvement of nonschool persons specifically prohibits parents of
students from directing, conducting, controlling, or regularly attending
activities of student groups.74
The Equal Access Act and Gay Straight Alliance Groups
Students desiring to initiate groups such as the GSA, or other such
tolerance groups, have inundated the courts with claims under the
EAA.75 Generally, courts have held that, if a school contains at least one
noncurriculum-related club, then it must accommodate the GSA with the
same access afforded to other school clubs.76 While the focus of this
73

See id.
See id.
75
See, e.g., White Cnty., 2006 WL 1991990.
76
See, e.g., Gay-Straight Alliance of Okeechobee High Sch. v. School Bd. of
Okeechobee County, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that the GSA’s
purpose was to promote tolerance and equality among students, regardless of sexual
orientation); 483 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (court granted GSA’s request for
preliminary injunction and ordered school board to officially recognize the GSA with the
privileges granted to other school clubs); 242 F.R.D. 644 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2007)
(granting protective order for discovery); 571 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (permanently enjoining
school board “from denying equal access and recognition to the GSA at OHS as a
noncurricular student group which shall be afforded all rights and privileges granted to
other noncurricular student groups”); Straights and Gays for Equality (SAGE) v. Osseo
Area Schs, Dist. No. 279, 2006 WL 983904 (D. Minn. Apr. 4, 2006) (granting SAGE’s
motion for preliminary injunction and holding that preclusion of SAGE, when school has
at least nine other noncurricular groups, violates EAA); 2006 WL 890754 (D. Minn. Apr.
6, 2006) (denying school district’s motion to temporarily stay the order of April 4, 2006);
471 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding district court’s order granting SAGE’s motion
for preliminary injunction); 2007 WL 2885810 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2007) (court grants
SAGE’s motion for partial summary judgment, holding that preclusion of SAGE, when
school has at least nine other noncurricular groups, violates EAA); Boyd County High
Sch. Gay Straight Alliance (GSA) v. Board of Educ. of Boyd County, 258 F. Supp. 2d
667 (E.D. Ky 2003) (court enjoined school board to give GSA equal status as other
student groups); Colin by and through Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d
1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that existence of other noncurriculum-related clubs
established limited open forum and preclusion of GSA violated EAA); but see, Caudillo
v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 2003 WL 22670934 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2003); 311 F.
Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that the entire subject matter of sexual activity
was banned at the school, that the information on the group’s web site was lewd and
offensive, the group’s existence and message created a material and substantial
interference with the district’s educational mission, and therefore preclusion was not
based on the group’s viewpoint); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of Educ. of
Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that the school
did not have any “noncurriculum related” clubs and the EAA did not apply); 81 F. Supp.
2d 1199 (D. Utah 1999) (finding that the school’s accommodation of only curriculum
related clubs does not result in viewpoint discrimination against GSA); 81 F. Supp. 2d
1166 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that “if” another noncurriculum related club existed at the
74
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article is not the application of the EAA to GSA-type clubs, it is
important to understand the sometimes-hostile political climate in which
GSA or similar clubs seek formation.77 Furthermore, court decisions
holding that local school boards may not preclude these GSA-type clubs
from formation without violating the EAA,78 have resulted in state
legislation or local policies attempting to limit membership to GSA by
requiring parental permission to join.79
The Georgia “Parental Consent to Clubs” Statutes Conflicts with
Language in the Equal Access Act
Before considering the constitutionality of Georgia’s “parental
consent to clubs” statute, we must address the incompatibility of the
statutory language between the Georgia statute and the EAA.
Specifically, the Georgia statute requires parental consent for “[c]lubs
and organizations,” which “means clubs and organizations comprised of
students who wish to organize and meet for common goals, objectives, or
purposes and which is [sic] directly under the sponsorship, direction, and
control of the school.”80 However, the EAA states that “[s]chools shall be
deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct a
meeting within its limited open forum if such school uniformly provides
that . . . there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the
government, or its agents or employees . . . .”81 Per the EAA,
“‘sponsorship’ includes the act of promoting, leading, or participating in
a meeting. The assignment of a teacher, administrator, or other school
employee to a meeting for custodial purposes does not constitute
sponsorship of the meeting.”82 “The term ‘meeting’ includes those
school, then precluding the GSA would violate the EAA); 1999 WL 1390255 (D. Utah
Nov. 30, 1999) (court dismissed plaintiffs’ second amended complaint for injunctive
relief because defendant’s resounding affirmation that “gay-positive” viewpoints could
be freely expressed in curriculum-related student groups, coupled with the fact that no
student was reprimanded for expression of “gay positive” views, dispelled any inference
that an unwritten policy forbade “gay-positive” views).
77
See, e.g., GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY LEGISLATION, 2005-2006 Regular Session
- SB 413 Compulsory School Attendance Law; exemptions; provide local board of
education policies; minimum annual attendance; change provisions, Status History,
available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/20052006/SB/413; SB
413, 2006 Sess. (Ga. 2006), Floor Amend. I AM 33 0426 available at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20052006/58338.pdf.
78
See, e.g., White Cnty., 2006 WL 1991990. (litigation which gave rise to the
insertion of the “parental consent to student clubs” language into already-existing SB 413
by Georgia Senator Nancy Schaefer, who represents White County).
79
See id.
80
O.C.G. § 20-2-705 (a)(1) (2006) (emphasis supplied).
81
20 U.S.C. § 4071 (c)(2) (emphasis supplied).
82
20 U.S.C. § 4072.
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activities of student groups which are permitted under a school’s limited
open forum and are not directly related to the school curriculum.”83
The EAA trumps all conflicting state legislation.84 Under the
Georgia statute, only clubs and organizations “directly under the
sponsorship” of the school are subject to the parental consent
requirement.85 Yet, since the EAA forbids school “sponsorship” of a
noncurricular student club, then any noncurriculum-related student club
(i.e., one which the school shall not sponsor without violating the EAA)
cannot be subject to the Georgia parental consent statute.86 In other
words, noncurriculum-related clubs and organizations (such as the GSA
and Bible clubs),87 which, per the EAA, cannot be sponsored by the
school, are not subject to the Georgia parental consent statute, which
applies to clubs or organizations sponsored by the school.88 Accordingly,
applying the Georgia parental consent statute to any noncurriculumrelated club would violate the EAA.89
PARENTAL CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN
STUDENT CLUBS MAY VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Students’ First Amendment Rights to Free Speech and Expression at
School
To fully deconstruct and analyze the constitutionality of the
Georgia “parental consent to clubs” statute, it is necessary to review
several tenets of the First Amendment law, and how these are applied to
students in public schools. The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”90

83

20 U.S.C. § 4072.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amend. I. (in addition to the constraints placed on
school-sponsorship of student clubs in the EAA, schools may not affirmatively sponsor
Bible clubs or other religious clubs (although they must accommodate them) in order to
avoid the appearance of establishing or endorsing religion in contravention of the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause)
88
20 U.S.C. § 4071.
89
Id.
90
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
84
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The First Amendment applies to all “people,” thus, students do not
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”91 The Court has held that religious worship and
discussion “are forms of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment.”92 Additionally, “[t]he First Amendment protects
[individuals’] right[s] not only to advocate their cause, but also to select
what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing.”93
Accordingly, the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to join
groups and associate with others holding similar beliefs.94 Justice Powell
has written, “[a] stereotypical reaction to particular characteristics of a
disfavored group cannot justify discriminatory legislation.95 It is
nevertheless important to remember that the First Amendment protects
an individual’s right to entertain unsound and unpopular beliefs . . . and
to expound those beliefs publicly . . . [f]resh air and open discussion are
better cures for vicious prejudice than are secrecy and dissembling.”96
In the seminal case West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
[W]e apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that
freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will
disintegrate the social organization. . . .We can have intellectual
individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional
minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes.
When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with
here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to
things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception,
they do not now occur to us.97
91

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1967).
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
93
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government Pac, 528 U.S. 377, 417 n.5, 120 S. Ct. 897
(2000) (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424, 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988)).
94
Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 163-64, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1096–97 (1992)
(citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, (1958)).
95
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 648 n.31 (1982) (citing, e. g., Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 520–521 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
96
Id. at 648 .
97
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943) (court
held that the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute—a form of
92
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Long after the Barnette decision, the Supreme Court has had
several occasions to scrutinize the speech and association rights of
students.98 The Court has stated “the constitutional rights of students in
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults
in other settings.”99 The Court also has held that First Amendment rights
“must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.’”100
In its examination of student speech rights and limitations, the
Court held that a school may censor student speech if it reasonably
threatens to materially and “substantially interfere with the work of the
school or impinge upon the rights of other students.”101 To exercise this
censorship, however, the school “must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”102
Speech that is merely offensive to the listener does not constitute
“imping[ing] on the rights of other students.”103
Additionally, a school may regulate “plainly offensive” speech, or
speech that is “sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd,” as part of its mission
to instill those “fundamental values of ‘habits and manners of civility’
essential to a democratic society.”104 The Court explained that “[t]he
undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of sociallyappropriate behavior.”105
Furthermore, a school may censor “school-sponsored” speech that
is inconsistent with the school’s “basic educational mission.”106 The
United States Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
explained, “[t]he question whether the First Amendment requires a
utterance protected by the First Amendment—and pledge transcended constitutional
limitations on their power and invaded the sphere of intellect and spirit which was the
purpose of the First Amendment to reserve from all official control).
98
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
99
Id.
100
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
101
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
102
Id. (students wore black armbands to school in protest of Vietnam war; school
could not censor the black armbands simply because it had an “undifferentiated fear” of
classroom disruption).
103
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.5 (1988).
104
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681, 683–84, (school allowed to ban sexually-suggestive
student speech delivered to a “captive audience” of six hundred students in connection
with a student government campaign).
105
Id. at 681.
106
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266.
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school to tolerate particular student speech [i.e., the question addressed
in Tinker] is different from the question whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular speech.”107 The
Court held, “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”108 Therefore, the Tinker
decision controls a school’s ability to censor non-school-sponsored
speech, while Hazelwood governs a school’s ability to regulate what “is
in essence the school’s own speech, that is, articles that appear in a
publication that is an official school organ.”109
Parental Notification Provisions for Student Opt-Out of the Pledge of
Allegiance: A Split in the Circuits
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality
of requiring parental consent for a student to opt-out of the Pledge of
Allegiance in Circle School v. Pappert.110 In Pappert, a Pennsylvania
statute mandated that all public, private, and parochial schools within the
Commonwealth display the United States flag in every classroom and
provide for recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance or the National Anthem
every school day.111 The Pennsylvania statute gave students the option of
refraining from participation in reciting and saluting the flag on religious
or personal grounds.112 It also required the school to notify, in writing,
parents or guardians of those students who exercised the option of
refraining from participation in reciting and saluting the flag.113 The
Third Circuit held that the parental notification provision of the
Pennsylvania statute violated students’ First Amendment right to free
speech and was unconstitutional.114 The court found disturbing testimony
by a Pennsylvania Representative’s testimony that, if a high school
senior decided he did not want to say the Pledge of Allegiance, and if his
parent would not give him permission to opt out, then the student could
be compelled to say the Pledge and, further, could be disciplined for
107

Id. at 270–71 (emphasis added).
Id. at 273.
109
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 (2001) (Alito, J., concurring).
110
381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004), aff’g The Circle School v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d
616 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
111
Pappert, 381 F.3d at 174 (allowing private and parochial schools to opt out on
religious grounds).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 174–175.
114
Id. at 174 (also holding that certain of the statute’s provisions violated private
schools’ First Amendment right to free expressive association).
108
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noncompliance.115 The court found convincing the plaintiff-student’s
argument that the parental notification portion of the statute served as a
deterrent to his exercise of free expression right not to participate in such
recitation.116 Citing Tinker, the court reminded us that it “can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”117 The court
then examined the student speech cases discussed above, including the
Fraser, Hazelwood, and Barnette cases.118
The court found that a parental notification provision “limited only
to parents of students who refuse to engage in such recitation may have
been purposefully drafted to ‘chill speech by providing a disincentive to
opting out of [the Act].’”119 Indeed, the legislative history for the
Pennsylvania Act provided “some evidence that such disincentive was
indeed part of the Commonwealth’s motivation in adopting the parental
notification scheme.”120 While acknowledging that one legislator’s
motivation in drafting a statute is not dispositive, “the view of the
legislator who introduced the bill sheds some light on its underlying
motivation.”121 Citing the Supreme Court, the court reiterated
“‘constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or ‘chilling,’
effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition
against the exercise of First Amendment rights.’”122
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court’s characterization of
the parental notification requirement as a “viewpoint-based regulation
that operates to chill student speech,” and that this provision:
cannot survive strict scrutiny required for such viewpoint
discrimination because it is not the most narrowly tailored method to
achieve the government’s interest in notifying the parents of the
administration of the [statute], an interest that is, in any case, not
sufficiently compelling to infringe on students’ free speech rights.123

115

Id. at 175.
Pappert, 381 F.3d at 175–76.
Id. at 174 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (1967)).
118
Id. at 177–78.
119
Id. at 181 (citing The Circle School v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616, 624 (2003)).
120
Id. at 181 n.3 (citing Representative Egolf’s suggestion that if a student refuses to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance or the national anthem and the student’s parents do not
agree with the student’s decision, then the school may impose “‘whatever sanctions the
school does for other disciplinary things,’” quoting The Circle School v. Phillips, 270 F.
Supp. 2d 616, 624 (2003)).
121
Id.
122
Pappert, 381 F.3d at 181 (quoting Board of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S.
668, 674 (1996), quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11, 92 S. Ct. 2318 (1972)).
123
Id. at 176-77, 181.
116
117
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The Pennsylvania parental notification provision “clearly
discriminates among students based on the viewpoints they express; it is
‘only triggered when a student exercises his or her First Amendment
right not to [engage in recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance or national
anthem or in flag salutation].’”124 Accordingly, the court struck down the
provision as unconstitutional.125
More recently, the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, in determining the constitutionality of a Florida statute, similar
to the Pennsylvania notification act discussed above, held that, while a
parent has a fundamental right to control the upbringing and direct the
education of their children,126 this right “does not translate into a
requirement that a parent must give prior approval of a child’s exercise
of First Amendment rights in a school setting.”127 Accordingly, the court
ruled that a Florida statute requiring parental consent to opt out of the
Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutionally infringes upon students’ First
Amendment rights.128
On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part the district court’s decision. In reversing the district
court’s holding that requiring parental consent for a student to opt-out of
saying the Pledge, the Eleventh Circuit wrote:
Although we accept that the government ordinarily may not compel
students to participate in the Pledge, e.g., Barnette, 63 S. Ct. at 1187, we
also recognize that a parent’s right to interfere with the wishes of his
child is stronger than a public school official’s right to interfere on behalf
of the school’s own interest.129 And this Court and others have routinely
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Id. at 183.
126
Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2008) (overruling Frazier v. Alexandre,
434 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1367-1368 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); Meyer v. State of
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972)).
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Id. (disagreeing with the holding in Circle School because, unlike the Florida
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notification act did not infringe upon students’ First Amendment rights; however, the
Florida statute was “far more restrictive,” p. 1365, and violated the First Amendment
rights of students).
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Frazier, 535 F.3d at 1285, citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
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acknowledged parents as having the principal role in guiding how their
children will be educated on civic values.130
We conclude that the State’s interest in recognizing and protecting
the rights of parents on some educational issues is sufficient to justify the
restriction of some students’ freedom of speech. Even if the balance of
parental, student, and school rights might favor the rights of a mature
high school student in a specific instance, Plaintiff has not persuaded us
that the balance favors students in a substantial number of instances—
particularly those instances involving elementary and middle school
students—relative to the total number of students covered by the
statute.131
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the parent’s right to control
her child’s upbringing132 outweighs the student’s First Amendment
rights.133 In doing so, however, the court emphasized that it evaluated
only the face of the statute, and not the statute as applied: “[t]o the
degree that the district court’s judgment invalidates the ‘written request
by . . . parent’ requirement of the Pledge Statute, the judgment is
reversed. We stress that we decide and hint at nothing about the Pledge
Statute’s constitutionality as applied to a specific student or a specific
division of students.”134
Policies Requiring Parental Consent for Participation in Clubs Infringe
upon Students’ First Amendment Rights
Students—particularly secondary school students—do not shed
their constitutional rights to free speech and expression at the
schoolhouse gate.135 None of the limitations on student speech, including
the Tinker “substantial disruption” test, the Bethel lewd and offensive
language test, nor the Hazelwood “school-sponsored speech” test applies
130

Id., citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (refusing to enforce a
compulsory education requirement beyond the eighth grade where doing so would
infringe upon the free exercise of the Amish religion and intrude on the “fundamental
interest of parents . . . to guide the religious future and education of their children”);
Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County, 880 F.2d 305, 313 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Within
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Id., citing Muller by Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th
Cir. 1996) (“Age is a critical factor in student speech cases.”); see also Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (“[T]he over breadth of a statute must not only be real,
but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”).
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to the parental consent provision.136 As with spoken or written speech by
students at school, students’ decisions to initiate or join a club clearly are
protected by the First Amendment as free speech, free expression, and
free association. While the Eleventh Circuit’s Fraser v. Winn decision
“hinted” at its inclination when asked to weigh the rights of parents
versus the First Amendment rights of students, it was very clear that the
decision involved a very narrow holding about the facial constitutionality
of the Florida pledge statute.137 Accordingly, the “jury is still out” in the
Eleventh Circuit on whether the Georgia parental consent for
participation statute, as applied to students such as those interested in
joining a religious club, violates some students’ First Amendment
rights.138
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s holding, the Third Circuit held
that requiring parental notification prior to a student’s opting out of
saying the Pledge of Allegiance at school, has a chilling effect on their
speech and violates their First Amendment rights.139 By analogy,
requiring students to obtain parental consent to participate in clubs—
particularly clubs based on religious, philosophical, or political beliefs—
also has a chilling effect on their speech in violation of the First
Amendment. Consider the student who holds a belief in Christianity, yet
comes from a Muslim family. In parental-consent states and school
divisions, this child would not be able to exercise her religious beliefs
and religious speech rights to explore her Christian faith without gaining
parental permission. Furthermore more, it would not matter if this child
were eighteen years old. Under the Georgia (and similar) statutes, an
eighteen-year-old student’s parent still must consent prior to her joining a
club.140 As such, a parent can hinder the religious practice and religious
speech of a student.
Further, the Georgia statute cannot apply to religious clubs without
running afoul of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The
Georgia statute requires parental consent for a student’s participation in
clubs or organizations which are “directly under the sponsorship,
direction, and control of the school.”141 The Establishment Clause
prohibits schools from affirmatively sponsoring (promoting) religious
clubs.142 Accordingly, the Georgia parental consent statute, which only
136
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applies to those clubs or organizations directly sponsored, directed and
controlled by the school, cannot apply to religious clubs because a school
cannot sponsor, direct and control religious speech.143 As such, the mere
act of applying Georgia parental consent requirements to student
participation in religious clubs violates the Establishment Clause.144
Therefore, Georgia schools may not subject student participation in
religious organizations to the parental consent statute.145
By logical extension, the effect of excluding only religious-based
clubs from the Georgia statute (because applying the statute to religious
clubs would suggest that the school directly sponsored, directed and
controlled the religious club) would be favoring religious clubs.146
Excluding Bible or religious clubs from parental consent, but not other
clubs—such as the GSA—potentially discriminates against other clubs in
favor of religious clubs in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.147 In other words, requiring parental consent for all but
religious clubs constitutes preference for religious clubs, which similarly
violates the Establishment Clause and amounts to viewpoint
discrimination against non-religious clubs (i.e., subjecting non-religious
clubs to different standards than religious clubs).148
A PARENT’S RIGHT TO DIRECT THE UPBRINGING OF HER
CHILD DOES NOT JUSTIFY INFRINGEMENT ON STUDENTS’
RIGHTS
Crucial to a parent’s position favoring a parental consent
requirement for student participation in clubs is the assertion of the
parent’s right to direct the education and upbringing of their child.149
Importantly, courts have generally construed this right to protect a
parent’s right to direct the religious education of his or her child.150
While parents do have the right to direct and control the education and
upbringing of their children, this right is not absolute and should not
interfere, absent a compelling interest, with students’ exercise of First
Amendment rights.151 Moreover, when this right conflicts with a school
district’s curricular choices, so long as the district’s choices do not
infringe upon another constitutional principle, the school district’s right
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
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to select the curriculum trumps a parent’s right to direct the education of
his or her child.152
The issue here is whether a parent’s right to direct the religious
education of his or her child, as exercised through parental non-consent
for her child’s participation in a club, outweighs the student’s individual
rights guaranteed under the First Amendment and the EAA even at the
“schoolhouse gate.”153 The question may be closer if the state were
requiring student participation in an activity in which the parent did not
want his or her child to participate; yet, even in this circumstance, courts
have held that parents do not have the right to opt their children out of
curriculum and instruction even when the materials reference viewpoints
inconsistent with the parents’ beliefs.154 Here, however, the student (at
her own behest and not at the direction of the school) desires to express
himself or herself through association with a particular club, yet the state
only allows the student to join the club upon his parent’s permission.155
Were the parent to withhold his or her consent for the student’s
152
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participation, the parent would do so in contravention of the student’s
viewpoint, placing a hindrance on the student’s otherwise-protected free
speech and association rights.156 Moreover, since a parent’s rights to
direct the education of his or her child does not trump a school district’s
authority to set the curriculum, it seems unlikely that it would trump an
individual student’s First Amendment rights that are protected through
her associations and expressions at school.
CONCLUSION
In this article, the author reviewed the Georgia “parental consent for
clubs” statute, including the White County litigation over a proposed
GSA and such litigation’s ties to the Georgia statute’s legislative
history.157 The Georgia statute serves as a proxy for all similar state laws
and local school district policies.158 This article has explored the current
law on student speech, on the EAA as contrasted with the Georgia
statute, and on two recent decisions regarding whether parental
notification and consent requirements for students opting out of the
Pledge were unconstitutional, viewpoint-based discrimination in
violation of students’ First Amendment rights. In applying the
aforementioned law to the Georgia statute (and similar state laws and
school district policies), the author argues that requiring parental consent
for a student to participate in a school-based (although, not necessarily
school-sponsored or curriculum related) club violates students’ First
Amendment rights.
It is only a matter of time before some plaintiff challenges
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-750 (or a similar law or policy, such as 70 Okla. St. §
24-105 or Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11-1210) as being both in conflict with
the EAA and an unconstitutional infringement on student speech,
association, expression, and—sometimes—religious rights. In the
interest of avoiding liability for violation of a “clearly established”
constitutional right, it would behoove school districts to obtain an
opinion from the Georgia Attorney General, from their school board
counsel, or thwart implementation of the statute and await further
guidance from the courts.159 Otherwise, what generally would result in, at
most, a preliminary injunction against the school for imposing the statute
may result in damages levied against the school districts.
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